

THE OPERATIONS OF THE SERVICE COMPANY (163rd INFANTRY)
THE FORTY-FIRST UNITED STATES INFANTRY DIVISION
IN THE INVASION OF MINDINAO ISLAND
5 MARCH - 7 APRIL 1945
(SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of the Company Commander)

Type of operation described: SERVICE COMPANY IN COMBAT

Captain Robert B. Campbell

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INTRODUCTION

The 41st Division--The Sunset Division--a National Guard unit from the northwest, had completed its New Guinea campaign in the fall of 1944 with the close of the battle of Biak. Normal battle attrition and rotation had depleted the ranks somewhat; but between Sept 1944 and Jan 1945, replacements were given to the division, and these men were integrated into their units by going on combat patrols to hunt down small groups of Japs, who were wandering around in the jungles. In addition, an elaborate training program was operated in which all troops participated in Company, battalion and regimental tactical maneuver problems. (1)

Rumors flew thick and fast as to where and when our next move would be, so it was with little surprise that in Jan 194⁵ the division was ordered to make another move. Orders were indefinite as to type of loading except that it would be tactical--administrative. In other words, if necessary be prepared to come off fighting. Much speculation was given to our destination. Besides the ever present rumor of return to the States, some of these were: land in Lingayen Gulf and help with the push on Manila, go to Java, land on China, and join another task force to make a landing on Japan proper. However, after a few days at sea, the announcement was made that we would land in San Jose on Mindoro, and await further orders. This landing was made, and soon the division was preparing for another mission. (2)

The division had landed in Australia in the spring of 1942, and had participated in six amphibious landings. They had fought only once,

(1, 2) A-5

however, as a division, and this in the battle of Biak. This time we felt sure that we would be assigned as a division, and not as separate Regimental Combat Teams. However, the 186th Inf was assigned the mission of landing on Palawan, in the Southern Philippines, on 28 Feb 1945. (3)

This was the island where many American and Allied troops were murdered by shooting and burning by the Jap garrison only a few weeks before.

The rest of the division--The 162nd & 163rd Inf--was alerted to move on another operation. The exact date was not announced; but re-equipment was speeded up, and tentative plans drawn for the move. (4)

As soon as information was available to the regimental commander of the 163rd Inf, he passed it to all subordinate commanders, and staff officers. As a result most people were informed as to the major details weeks before the detailed planning was started. (5)

During the planning phase all battalion commanders, and separate company commanders, were included in the conferences, and details ironed out on the spot. All possible information was given the troops--consistent with security. (6)

(7)

Major Howard I. Nelson, the regimental S-4, conducted conferences with the officers of Service Company in which he outlined his Supply plan. These plans were discussed, and the final plan drawn up for the Reg'tl field order. This type of planning aided the Service Company Commander to formulate his order, and to present it to the officers and men, so that everyone would know his exact job. (8)

The morale of the company was extremely high at this time. They had been in the jungles for many months, and the first signs of civilization were really appreciated. Railroads, real buildings, and paved roads were indeed an unaccustomed sight to them.

During the staging period the company participated in that

(3) AIP-11; (5, 6, 8) A-5; (7) A-2

favorite Philippine sport, Cockfighting. Each section of the company would purchase itself a cock, and pit it against the cocks of other sections. The drivers had built a pit, and the supply section enclosed it in burlap. It seems there were enough roosters in the company to start a good sized farm; and it was disconcerting to be awakened at 4 a.m. with roosters crowing from every tent. However, we were located far enough from other troops that this remained a company problem. (9)

Cock fights were held each evening, and it was pathetic to see a man come to the ring carrying his pride and joy. The man would come with a smile on his face, confident of victory, only to carry his defeated--half dead rooster--back to his tent. A few hours later that same rooster would be boiling in a pot. It had the appearance of leather, but the men declared it tasted good. The Cock fighting was not officially condoned; but it was helpful in building the morale of the troops to a very high point. The men kept talking more of their favorite roosters than they did of the operation. (10)

The day before embarking the company was assembled in the company area, and maps of the proposed operational area were posted. This meeting was conducted by the company commander; and the gist of the meeting was as follows:

"As you know the 186th Inf has landed on Palawan, and they have captured their first objectives. The rest of the division will move from San Jose by Liberty Ship, LST, and LCI, and attack Zamboanga on March 10th. Beach defenses have been prepared by the Japs, and may be hard to take, However, the Navy is going to shell the beach with two light cruisers and six destroyers starting at 0700. The Air Corps has been bombing there for the past week, and will be dropping 1000-pound bombs on beach defenses, as well as troops inland. The objectives will be, first, to establish a beachhead, then capture the airfields.

(9, 10) A-5; (11) AIP 37; (12) AIP 46; (13) AIP 46

Next will be the liberation of the city of Zamboanga. The 162nd will be on the left, and the 163rd will be on the right. (14) After Zamboanga falls we will turn north and destroy the Japs. They will probably make a stand in the foothills about six miles north of the city. Further to the north the guerillas have blocks set up to prevent the Nips from escaping into the interior.

"As far as Zamboanga itself the climate is even all year round. There isn't any wet or dry season, but heavy rains fall all year round. It is only 70 degrees above the equator so the temperature averages 80° to 90°. The people there are mainly Moros, who are Mohammedan. They are a proud and warlike people. Do not trust them because many of them are strongly pro Jap. Above all, stay away from civilian eating places, because there are many tropical diseases such as dysentary, yaws, etc. We will continue to take atribrine because the malaria rate is very high there." (15)

"The 1st Sgt has put a list up on the bulletin board which shows what ship you go on as well as the Service Company officer or NCO on that ship. I will be on LCI 1076 with C Company. We will land near an old country club about H + 30, and a guide will be posted there to show you where Service Company will be set up for the first day. As far as mission is concerned we will continue to do our job as in garrison and that is to service the Regiment." This was followed by a general discussion as to loading and movement of troops to the shipping area. (16)

The Service Company personnel and equipment was scattered throughout nearly every ship of the regimental group, and did not load as a unit. Where the TQM called for certain equipment, men were notified and they rode the trucks to the embarking area, and thence to the ship. Camp was cleared about noon, and all personnel were aboard their respective vessels by early evening. (17)

The convoy arrived in the Zamboanga area during darkness of the

(14) A-2 overlay; (15) A-1, p 34; (16) A-2, A-4, A-5; (17) A-4, A-5.

morning of 10 March 1945. At daylight the Navy began to shell the beach head from the cruisers and destroyers. A short time later the Air Corps came in, and heavily bombed and strafed the beach. At 0915 the first troops hit the beach, and reached the 1st objective with only scattered rifle fire opposing them. The Japs had abandoned their beach defenses and were shelling the beaches from positions in the hills. (18)

At 0940, LCI 1076 approached the beach and dropped its ramp on top of a destroyed amphtrack. C, Company under Capt "Tip" Houston, crawled over the wreck, and Service Company followed. Warrant Officer Stanley Ferguson was the last man to leave the landing craft. (19)

The entire beach area was under intense artillery fire, and the ships were wasting no time in pulling away from the shore. The 20 men of Service Company were split into two columns one under Mr. Ferguson, and the other under the Company commander. These groups headed down the beach to the vicinity of the country club about 300 yards away. Upon reaching the designated area the troops were dispersed, and fox holes were dug. A messenger was dispatched to find the Regt'l S-4, and the company commander contacted Regt'l Hq which had landed some distance down the beach. A conference with Lt Col Leonard A. Wing, the Regt'l Exec officer, and Major Howard Nelson, the Regt'l S-4, resulted in an area location for Service Company. (20)

This location was reconnoitered by the S-4 and the company commander, and the company moved into it. Fox holes were dug around the area, and section assignments were made. A CP was set up, and messengers sent to the country club to collect other members of the company. About 100 yards to the west the QM had been unloading gasoline and oil when the Jap artillery registered a hit, and destroyed about 30% of the Task Force supply of POL. (21) The resulting smoke increased the tempo of artillery fire; but by this time the Field Artillery and Cannon

(18) A-1, p 46; (19) A-4, A-5; (20) A-4, A-5; (21) A-1, p 51.

Companies were set up, and were aiding the Navy in silencing the Nip guns. (22)

When darkness fell about two-thirds of the company had been assembled, and all available vehicles were sent to the beachmaster to continue the unloading. During the night additional trucks reported to the CP to drop their loads, and then to report back to the beach for further duty. While the loads were being taken from the trucks the drivers would start de-waterproofing procedures, the final touches to be done later. (23)

On March 11, Maj Gen Jens A. Doe, the division commander, inspected the beach defenses, and found the disposition of troops unsatisfactory. Units had unloaded during the night and were practically stacked on top of each other. (24)

Another reconnaissance by the S-4 and the company commander led to the decision to move the company further down the beach, closer to the fighting units. This move was effected during the morning, and a new perimeter was organized. The area was organized with Service Company taking part of the perimeter, and the kitchen, and baggage train taking the balance. Just about the time the installation was complet Capt Kryder Van Buskirk moved in with B Company of the 116th Medics, (24) and the 8th Portable Surgical Hospital. (25) The area was enlarged to accommodate these new units, and thereby spread the defenses very thin. However, just at dusk Company A (less one platoon) of the 716th Tank (26) Bn drove up, and asked if we knew where there was a good hard stand where they could park their tanks for the night. An excellent place was found to the flank of Service Company, and after a short conference with the C.O. the perimeter was completely ringed for the night. (27)

During this time the enemy continued to shell the beach, but this shelling diminished as contact was made by the foot elements. Also the Navy and artillery were keeping the enemy guns under fire, and had

(22) A-4, A-4; (23) A-4, p 24, A-5; (24, 25) A-2; (26) A-2; (27) A-5.

silenced many them. (28)

The line troops, by this time, had succeeded in entering Zamboanga, and had wheeled to the north in pursuit of the enemy. By March 12, the 3rd Bn had succeeded in clearing the city while the 1st and 2nd Bns were engaged just north of Santa Maria. (29)

It was decided to move the company closer to the fighting troops, and a reconnaissance for an area was made by Major Nelson, Capt George Leet, the Regt'l Motor Officer, Capt Jack Rosenfeld, the munitions officer, and the Service Company commander. However, they were driven from the area by artillery and machine gun fire. So this move was postponed for another day. (30)

On the morning of 13 March the entire perimeter moved to an area just south of Santa Maria near Moret Strip. The hospital units had just set up, and the regimental aid station erected, when word came that the advancing troops had been caught in a trap, and had suffered many casualties. Two companies, advancing abreast, had pushed to the top of a small hill when an electrically detonated torpedo mined area blew up. Approximately 65 casualties resulted, and they were soon streaming back to the medics in ambulances and trucks. The surgeons of the Regt'l Medics, The 8th Portable Surgical Hospital, and Company B 116th Medical Bn pooled their resources and equipment, and in a few hours had all the wounded fixed for further evacuation or back to duty. The "accident" occurred about 1200 yards north of Service Company's area, and whole blood was administered to the wounded as artillery fire dropped in the vicinity. (31) (32)

This perimeter became untenable for the Service units because of artillery fire. It had been set up about 200 yards behind the Regimental Cannon Company, and their fires were drawing counter battery fire. The overs were dropping into our area. For this reason another move was made further to the north. The area selected was located

(28) A-5; (29) A-1, p 51, A-5; (30) A-5; (31) A-5, A-1, p 53; (32) A-5.

on the Zamboanga-Pasanaca road, and ^{IN} an area formerly occupied by the Headquarters of the Japanese Naval forces. Regimental Headquarters took the right side of the road, and Service Company to the left. Anti-tank Company to the front of Headquarters, and Company D's mortars to Service Company's front. The regimental executive officer coordinated the perimeter defenses so that one unit would not be firing into the other in case of an attack. (33)

From this point the regiment was serviced as they continued their attack, and reduced the main Japanese forces in the vicinity of the reservoir at Pasanaca. (34) The regiment was relieved during the first part of April, and staged from this area for the second phase of the Victor IV operation--that of liberating the island of Jolo to the south.

From this point this monograph will cover in detail the actions of each of the twelve sections of the company during this operation. The company did not exist as a unit for two days, after which time all sections were back together again.

GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES

The Zamboanga Peninsula is located on the western half of the island of Mindinao of the Philippine Islands. It is approximately 150 miles long and 30 miles wide. It is bordered on the east by Sibuguey Bay, on the west by the Sulu Sea, and on the south by Basilan Strait.

The southern portion of the peninsula is thickly populated, but the interior is almost completely unexplored.

The capitol city itself was once a beautiful town of Spanish design with many lovely homes and a picturesque business district. The wharf was one of the finest in the Philippines, and was at the crossroads of commerce from the Indies to America. The town was equipped with such modern improvements as a central electric plant, sewage,

(33) A-5; (34) A-1, p 55.

telephones, et The Japanese destroyed the city before the Americans landed.

A plain surrounds the city for a distance of some 10 miles on either side, and five or six miles wide. Here many rice paddies are found as well as cocoanut plantations and hemp farms.

There are no important rivers in the area, but many streams could be regarded as obstacles. There is no wet or dry season, but heavy rainfall can be expected throughout the year. The city is located about 7° north of the equator so the temperature varies little during the year. It is located outside of the monsoon belt so few violent storms are encountered.

A good road net exists in the southern tip of the peninsula, and with light maintenance will carry all divisional traffic. Main roads were constructed of asphalt, and secondary roads of gravel.

The common tropical diseases such as malaria, dysentery, dengue, and yaws are to be found in abundance.

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

This group contained 15 men whose jobs were strictly for Service Company. 1st Sgt Mess, Supply, etc., and it is the only section⁽³⁵⁾ not having regimental duties. This section landed at J + 30 and immediately set up the Co CP. Messengers were dispatched to round up the rest of the company, and to guide them to the area. By noon the kitchen truck had come ashore, and the mess sgt had hot coffee⁽³⁶⁾ available for all who wished to wash down the K rations. The evening meal was served in the company CP from rations brought on the truck. Service Company's strength for the landing was approximately 80 men; but, as with all Service Companies, the ration strength varied greatly every day. The ration strength never fell below 100 and several times it exceeded 600 with the feeding of visiting troops. During the entire campaign not a

(35) A-2; (36) A-4.

single case of sickness was traced to the kitchen. This reflects great credit on Staff Sgt Bill Moody, and the cooks of the company. This feeding was done with two stoves and three immersion heaters. Two men were left at Mindoro from the kitchen force to cook for the rear echelon. (37)

In addition to his duties as administrative company commander this officer is also in command of the regimental train bivouac. During the Zamboanga operations this area included the 8th Portable Surgical Hospital under Capt Krupka, B Company of the 116th Medical Battalion, under Capt Kryder E. Van Buskirk, three battalion kitchen, and supply sections under the Battalion S-4's, as well as normal Service Company installations. (38) The Service Company commander was charged with the security of the perimeter. The entire installation was approximately 100 yards wide and 450 yards long. Coordination with adjacent units was made through the regimental executive officer. Company B of the Medics ^{was} ~~were~~ called on to man perimeter defenses one night, and then, with two infantry soldiers to each medic. However, this did not work out so the medics were excused from that duty. It seemed that every carabao that walked down the road was taken for a platoon of Japs, and the sleeping Infantry men would be awakened. To fill up the gap Col. Wing ordered anti-tank company to extend two of their positions into Service Company's area. That was the only additional help called for by the Service elements. (Each section of the Company was given its sector, and each battalion train had its own sector). The medics were kept in the center. (39)

In addition to the defenses he was responsible to the S-4 for the dispatching of ammo and ration vehicles to the forward elements. The stores were placed under canvas with the backs facing the front, which was about 1500 yards forward. The cooks would begin breakfast preparations about 0330, and the rations and ammo sent forward at about 0700. This of course varied with the desires of the battalion commanders.

(37) A-4; (38) A-3, A-4; (39) A-4, A-5.

For the first week, three hot meals daily were attempted, and while it was possible for us to get them up to the battalion, the CO's decided that a hot breakfast, a hot supper, and a cold lunch was better. The men in the lines, being under strain, could not handle the three hot meals. At the breakfast meal, Marmite cans with sandwiches would be delivered and distributed at noon. The method of supply was by $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck to battalion and out to positions by Jeep or hand carry in some cases. The battalion supply sections operated normally with the Bn S-4 forward with the Bn Commander, and the S-4 Sgt would operate in the train bivouac. Occasionally the officer would come back for a night and the Sgt go forward. (40)

1st Sgt Charles Matthews aided greatly in keeping track of the company during the initial phases of the operation. His schedules, and tables showing the location of personnel greatly facilitated the planning by the company commander. (41)

THE TRANSPORTATION SECTION

This section was very limited in its size on J day. Due to the lack of shipping, the regiment was authorized to take only 75% of its transportation. It was further decided that the heavier trucks would be cut to a minimum, and more emphasis placed on Jeeps, $3/4$ tons, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks. As a result only 13 $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton cargo trucks were scheduled to come with the advance echelon. The remainder would come on J + 7 and J + 14. In addition the water truck and the maintenance vehicles were included, bring the total $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks to 16. Each battalion was given three cargo trucks for kitchens, and separate companies one each. Further, all flame throwers in the regiment would be mobile loaded, and available on the first ship to land vehicles. The balance of the trucks were sent to mobile load communications equipment, ammo, and the regimental C.P. (42)

Due to the shortage of trucks in the task force, all cargo trucks

(40) A-1, p 113, A-3, A-4, A-5; (41) A-5; (42) A-4, A-5.

in the task force, all cargo trucks were required to drop their loads, and report back to the beach to assist in unloading the bulk supplies. It was during this phase that Service Company had its first casualty. T/5 Stevens reported to Service Company about 1300 on J day with two kitchens. These were unloaded, and he reported to the beachmaster, who assigned him to an LST unloading POL. On his first trip to the dump the Jap artillery began hitting the dump area. Stevens was hit in the back from shell fragments, but the truck was empty so no fire was started. The round had not hit the truck, and did no great amount of damage. The assistant driver brought the truck back to Service Company where "Doc", the aid man, patched him up. He was then taken to the beach and evacuated to Leyte. (43)

The transportation section handled all POL for the regiment. This section was composed of one man, T/5 Baker. The gasoline and oil re-supply was handled in a super service station fashion. Baker drew gas from Quartermaster in 55 gallon drums. These drums were then brought back to Service Company, and set up in a position where trucks could refill their tanks from them. Since all transportation was parked in the bivouac area it was not deemed necessary initially to have gas delivered to the battalion. When the drums were empty Baker would go to the beach, and fill them from the bulk storage plant. In addition, white gas for the kitchens was handled by this section. (44)

In addition to the regular equipment of the TO/E Service Company and Cannon Company were authorized a D/4 bulldozer by 6th Army, and these had been carried by the regiment as TO equipment. For several months T/5 "Shorty" Sanders was assigned to care for the "cat" of Service Company. This piece of equipment was worth its weight in gold to the regiment; garbage pits were dug and covered, gasoline dumps were made, grease pits for greasing vehicles, roads repaired to front line elements, debris buried on the battle area. In addition trenches were dug for

(43, 44) A-5; (45) A-6.

patients in the hospital units within Service Company area, and the operating tents of the 8th Portable Surgical Hospital were put down 7 feet below the surface of the ground. This enabled the surgeons to work 24 hours per day in relative safety. (46)

The normal method of supplying a regiment with water is by means of a 5 gallon water can exchange. However, on Biak the company had captured a Japanese water tank holding 1500 gallons. This tank was mounted on a $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck, and a 100 gal/min pump installed on the winch drive. This reduced transportation requirements to a minimum because the truck could go to an engineer storage tank, throw in its hose and pump the truck tank full in ten minutes. The water truck would then report back to the supply section where 5 gallon cans were filled for the forward units. Cannon Co, Headquarters Co, and Service Co contributed most of their cans to the pool, and their requirements met by filling Lyster bags from the truck in their company areas. Later an additional tank and pump were mounted on another truck, and these two trucks supplied the regiment with water in the rest areas. Over 16,000 gallons of water per day were hauled. (47)

The requirements of the division kept an average of 10 trucks busy on the beach for the first two weeks. Much credit is due to Capt George Leet, the regimental Motor Officer, and M/Sgt Hepner for their fine work in operating the transportation of the regiment. (48)

THE MAINTENANCE SECTION

This section was commanded by Warrant Officer Stanley Ferguson. It did not come in as a section because the majority of the mechanics doubled up as asst drivers of the vehicles. However, Mr. Ferguson set up a de-waterproofing station on the beach, and as soon as vehicles were available the minimum amount of de-waterproofing was accomplished. After the initial rush for vehicles was completed the trucks were

(46, 47) A-3, A-4, A-5; (48) A-5.

thoroughly de-erproofed. (49)

One of the improvements made by this section was the construction of an A frame on the wrecker. This device was installed by reinforcing the bumper and using the bumper for the base of the "A"; the frame was then bolted to the bumper. A pulley at the apex carried the cable from the winch, and the apparatus was called on many times by the Division G-4 to assist in unloading gasoline drums and other heavy equipment from the ships. (50)

During the Biak battle the regiment had captured an electric welder from the Japanese. A few alterations, and the installation of a 1/4 ton motor made it one of the main stays in the maintenance section. The supply of oxygen and acetylene for the TE welding equipment was critical in the theatre so most of the time our welding apparatus sat idle. However, with the addition of the power welder we were able to save our limited supply of gas for special work, and use the electric. One of the jobs done by this section was the welding of new runners in the field ranges of the regiment. The original stoves were constructed of stainless steel while the replacements were made of sheet iron. With light pieces of angle iron tacked in to place in the old stoves, we kept our salvage at a division low. The main problem was angle iron, and every driver slated to go to the beach was directed to pick up any piece of angle iron he could find from the wrecks in the buildings. Even the S-4 came in with pieces sticking out of his jeep. (51)

The roads in the Zamboanga area were filled with shell fragments from the shelling by Navy and Artillery as well as the heavy bombing by the Air Corps. As a result nearly every vehicle had its share of flat tires. To meet this situation the maintenance section set up a tire repair department. The flat would be removed from the truck, and a spare tire and wheel mounted. (52)

(49) A-4, A-5; (50, 51, 52) A-5.

The second casualty in the company came from the transportation section. Capt George Leet with T/5 Baker and T/5 Hart went forward to retrieve some enemy equipment. As they were examining it, the Nips opened up with a machine gun and killed Leet. The two men managed to crawl to safety and return to regiment where a patrol was organized from the I & R Platoon to recover his body. (53)

The normal maintenance work of the regiment was carried on during this period, and an 8th Army Ordinance Inspecting team gave the regiment superior about six weeks after the Jolo landing. This speaks very highly of the men in the maintenance section. (54)

AMMUNITION SECTION

This section was under the command of Capt Jack Rosenfeld who was ably assisted by Sgt Harvey Lucht. In the normal munitions section only three men are assigned duties, Regtl Munitions Officer, a Warrant Officer, and a Sergeant. However, the regiment had been separated on all occasions and the munitions section had grown to about ten men. (55) It acted then as an ammo supply point. All classes of ammunition were stored in a regimental dump except Cannon Co's 105. Approximately 2½ units of fire were kept there, and as front line elements drew from the Regtl dump it would be replaced by drawing from the Division Ammunition dump. Cannon Co drew their own, and passed a copy of their requisition to the Regtl dump. In addition, a weapons repair station was set up in which limited repairs could be made, thus insuring an adequate supply of small arms to the battalions. (56)

SUPPLY SECTION

This section under M/Sgt Otto Lawrence began functioning on D Day. The regiment had been ordered to carry gas masks to the first phase line; then masks would be collected from company dumps by Service Company after the troops shoved off. This detail was under Sgt Ralph

(53, 54) A-5; (55) A-4; (56) A-5

Michaelman, who so closely followed the advancing troops that his truck was nearly blown out from under him by Jap Artillery shelling. (57)

These masks proved to be a headache because every subsequent move required the transporting of the masks to a new area. Finally the Division CWS officer took them off our hands.

As far as rations were concerned the regiment was in fine shape for the first week with no outside help. Each soldier had two K (58) rations for the landing, and kitchen trucks had three to five days aboard them. In addition the supply section had secured extra coffee and sugar on Mindoro. It was transported ashore on one of the trucks on D Day. The Quartermaster, however, was able to make an issue on J + 3 and the normal cycle was started. These rations would be drawn from Quartermaster by the section, and then broken down by S/Sgt Clifford, the rations sgt. Since all kitchens except provisional battalion were in Sv. Co area, it was an easy matter to distribute them to the Co's. (59)

A regimental salvage section was set up under the command of the Service Company commander. (60) The purpose of this section was to lessen the waste of supplies and equipment on the battle field. All material was stacked in Bn areas and brought back to the Supply area. Contact with the medics also brought in much material. This equipment would be sorted, and serviceable material used to fill emergency requisitions from the line units. Most items such as web equipment, small arms, helmets, etc., were filled at once from these salvage stocks. (61)

From previous experience we knew that after the operation a glorified camp building program would ensue. With this in mind everyone was on the lookout for construction material. One day the Bn Commander of 1st Bn called and said he thought he had seen some nails in his area. The Service Company Commander took off with two trucks

(57) A-3, A-5; (58) A-2; (59) A-4, A-5; (60) A-2; (61) A-4, A-5

and came back with about 10 tons of nails and other building material. This was reported to G-4 who gave permission to retain it. When Camp construction started three months later we were still hunting for nails. (62)

Another duty performed by this department was the storage of all bulk supplies of the regiment. This was accomplished by utilizing some Japanese buildings within the area. Roads were built to enable the trucks to come directly from the beach and unload directly to the storage houses. (63)

Some months previous to this operation the 163rd Inf had been the Infantry element of a task force and had drawn a reefer for perishable supplies. This reefer, or mobile refrigerator, had never been turned in, and was carried by Service Company for keeping perishable supplies. For the first part of the operation it was used only by the medical installations to preserve blood and penicillin. Later the troops were served cold water from it and a schedule by battalion insured each battalion cold drinks every other day. Also, during the latter stages of the operation, three or four days supply of fresh meat would be issued to regiments by Quartermaster. The rations section of Service Company was able to make daily issues instead of giving the meat out all at once. The same was true of butter and eggs. (64)

The Chaplain, Ned Graves, was given the $3/4$ ^{TON} maintenance truck driven by T/5 Long for the purpose of transporting the dead from the battle area. He kept in close contact with the S-1 and S-3 sections and was able to keep the battalion areas clear. The dead would be taken from the battalion area or hospital area directly to the U. S. Cemetery on the beach. (66)

There are several sections of Service Company whose duties are directed by officers of the regimental staff. In this category are the S-1, Personnel, Mail, and Special Service sections under direction

(62, 63) A-5; (64) A-4, A-5; (66) A-5

of the S-1.

During this operation M/Sgt Hubert Kelly, the Sgt Major, landed on D Day, and ably assisted the Adjutant in operating the CP. (67)

The personnel section sent only one man forward, and he operated with the division in compiling records necessary for G-1 -- G-4. The rest of the section remained on Mindoro under command of Capt Max Morelock, the personnel officer. (68)

Special Service remained on Mindoro, and did not come to Zamboanga until the latter part of March. This section is authorized only two men, but had been increased to four men by the regimental commander. Two men operated the regimental PX. One was the movie operator, and the fourth took care of athletics. (69)

M/Sgt Tom Corbally, the operations Sgt, came ashore on D Day with Major Hamilton, the S-3, and ably assisted in keeping the operations section functioning in a superior manner. (70)

The mail section was split into two elements. One remained on Mindoro to sort mail. The forward element broke the mail down to companies and dispatched it out to the companies through the rations trucks. (71)

No discussion of the operation would be complete without discussing the medical units part in Service Company perimeter. Company B of the 116th Med Bn under command of Capt Kryder E. Van Buskirk gave invaluable service because he kept his unit up within range of Japanese small arms fire and was able to evacuate personnel from Bn Aid stations in the matter of a few minutes to his area where they were examined for further treatment. (72)

Next to the Collecting Company the 8th Portable Surgical Hospital was set up in dug out positions within blacked out operating tents. Under command of Capt Krupka, this unit was able to give definitive surgery 24 hours per day and were responsible for saving many lives by prompt surgical care. (73)

(67, 68) A-4, A-5; (69, 70, 71) A-5; (72) A-3, A-4, A-5; (73) A-3, A-4, A-5.

The regimental medical detachment under the regimental surgeon, Major Mark Holcomb kept his battalion teams fully supplied and aided in every way possible. In addition, Major Holcomb instituted a program during this battle which kept many men on the fighting front. (74)

In a conference with Van Buskirk, Krupka, and the Service Company commander, he requested that all men sent from the lines as psychoneurotic cases be examined carefully. All definitely serious cases would be sent to the rear for treatment. However, too many men were going to hospitals, and getting worse due to lack of activity. He requested that men who were just physically tired or had "war nerves" be sent to him. The Service Company agreed to keep these men in its area, and keep them busy. As a result every man kept at Service Company was able to return to duty, and few ever returned for PN treatment. During their stay at Service Company they were assigned jobs aiding the supply section, repairing tires, stacking ammunition, and practically everything except work in the kitchens. It was felt that Service Company would hold little or no stigma for them, but their comrades would not feel the same if they were given KP jobs around their own kitchens. (75)

As the campaign grew to a close, word was received that resulted in 163rd Inf going on another mission. J day had been March 10 and the new J day April 9. This time the action took the regiment to Jolo a few hundred miles further south. Naturally the regiment was not up to full TO &E and requisitions were given special priority to bring the units back up to fighting strength again. This involved many long hours of hard work by all supply personnel of the regiment. In addition it was ordered that Service Company would act as the Supply force for the next operation with no additional men. This was accepted of course and all attachments to supply such as ^{AS} services, bakery, military police, PCAU (Philippine Commonwealth Administrative Unit) etc., were

(74) A-3, A-4, A-5; (75) A-4, A-5.

attached to Service Company for rations and quarters. These plans were worked out in detail, and the regiment left Zamboanga for Jolo on 8 April 1945, thus completing the combat stay on Zamboanga. (76)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In making an analysis of this operation it must be remembered that this company had been in the Pacific since the spring of 1942. It had participated on many amphibious operations during this time. For the majority of the men, this was their fifth landing. For this reason, the men were thoroughly experienced in their jobs.

The senior commander, Col William J. Moroney, and the executive officer, Lt Col Leonard A Wing, had seen duty with Service Companies and knew the problems encountered by it. The Regtl S-4, Major Howard Nelson, had previously commanded Service Company.

1st: While it is impossible to accurately predict enemy opposition more care could have been given in the selection of type vehicles brought in on D Day. In this operation only three $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks were allowed each battalion. This meant two kitchen per truck. To have such vital equipment so concentrated is unwise.

2d: The Service Company commander used poor judgement at times in the selection of areas, resulting in the unit being subjected to artillery fire needlessly.

3d: Before moving Service units forward a thorough reconnaissance should be made of the new area. In some instances time was not allowed for this and almost led to disastrous results.

4th: The S-3 should be acquainted with the functions and mission of Service Company. During training, road marches and parades were scheduled for the company by the S-3. After a thorough discussion this was eliminated, and more stress placed on sectional training.

(76) A-4, A-5.